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I SchoolofLaw

Environmental Law and Justice Clinic

September 6, 2019
Via e-mail and U.S . mail
Derek J. Robinson, BRAC Environmental Coordinator
Department of the Navy
Base Realignment and Closure Program Management Office West
33000 Nixie Way, Building 50, Suite 207
San Diego, CA 92147
Re :

Comments from Greenaction for Health and Environmental
Justice Regarding Navy' s Draft Addendum to Five-Year
Review (Evaluation of Radiological Remedial Goals for Soil,
Hunters Point Naval Shipyard)

Dear Mr. Robinson:
On August 8, 2019, the Department of the Navy issued a Draft Addendum to
the Five-Year Review, enclosing an Evaluation of Radiological Remedial Goals for
Soil at the Hunters Point Naval Shipyard ("HPNS"), and provided a 30-day period for
both the public and regulatory agencies to review and comment on the document.
This letter, submitted on behalf of Greenaction for Health and Environmental Justice
("Greenaction"), contains comments regarding the Navy' s Draft Addendum. In its
Fourth Five-Year Review, the Navy stated that it would issue a Draft Addendum to
evaluate the long-term protectiveness of the Remediation Goals for soil, and would
prepare responses to regulatory agency comments and a responsiveness summary to
comments from the public. NA VF AC's Final Fourth Five-Year Review at 7-3 (July
2019) (hereafter "Fourth FYR"). We request the Navy to provide a written response
to these comments when it finalizes the Draft Addendum.
I.

BACKGROUND
A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework
1. Five-Year Review

Mailing Address:
536 Mission Street
San Francisco, CA
94105-2968
Offices:
40 Jessie Street
Suite 530
San Francisco, CA
tel: (415) 442-6647
fax (415) 896-2450
www .gg u. ed u/la w/e Ijc

Section 121(c) ofthe Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act ("CERCLA") requires the Navy, as the lead agency for HPNS , to
prepare a review of the remedial action at HPNS "no less often than each 5 years after
the initiation of such remedial action to assure that human health and the environment
are being protected by the remedial action being implemented." 42 U.S.C. § 9621(c).
Pursuant to the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan
("NCP"), the lead agency must conduct a five-year review " [i]f a remedial action is
selected that results in hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants remaining at
the site above levels that allow for unlimited use and unrestricted exposure." 40
C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(4)(ii).
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The "purpose of a five-year review is to evaluate the implementation and
performance of a remedy in order to determine if the remedy is or will be protective of
human health and the environment." Comprehensive Five-Year Review Guidance at
1-1, OSWER No. 9355.7-038-P, EPA 540-R-01-007 (June 2001) (hereafter
"Comprehensive FYR Guidance"). For federal facilities such as HPNS subject to 42
U.S.C. § 9620, five-year reviews are conducted by the Federal agency or department
that has jurisdiction over the site, "but EPA retains final authority over whether the
five-year reviews adequately address the protectiveness of remedies." Comprehensive
FYR Guidance at 2-5.
2. Acceptable Exposure Levels for Remedial Actions
As the D.C. Circuit explained: "[w]hen EPA develops objectives for a
remedial action at a site, it selects a remedial goal that 'establish[es] acceptable
exposure levels that are protective ofhuman health." State of Ohio v. U.S. E.P.A.,
997 F.2d 1520, 1533 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing NCP at 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(e)(2)(i)).
According to the NCP:
For known or suspected carcinogens, acceptable exposure levels are
generally concentration levels that represent an excess upper bound
lifetime cancer risk to an individual ofbetween 10-4 and 10-6 using
information on the relationship between dose and response. The 1 o- 6
risk level shall be used as the point ofdeparture for determining
remediation goals for alternatives when ARARs are not available or
are not sufficiently protective because of the presence of multiple
contaminants at a site or multiple pathways of exposure.
40 C.F.R. § 300.430(e)(2)(i)(A)(2) (emphasis added). "A 104 risk subjects the
surrounding population to an increased cancer risk of 1 in 10,000. A I o-6 risk subjects
the surrounding population to an increased cancer risk of 1 in 1,000,000." State of
Ohio, 997 F.2d at 1533.
In the Preamble to the NCP, EPA stated: "By using 10"6 as the point of
departure, EPA intends that there be a preference for setting remediation goals at the
more protective end of the range, other things being equal." 55 Fed. Reg. 8,666, 8,718
(March 8, 1990). EPA explained the resulting process as follows:
The use of 1o-6 expresses EPA's preference for remedial actions that
result in risks at the more protective end of the risk range, but this does
not reflect a presumption that the final remedial action should attain
such a risk level. Factors related to exposure, uncertainty and technical
limitations may justify modification of initial cleanup levels that are
based on the 1o-6 risk level. The ultimate decision on what level of
protection will be appropriate depends on the selected remedy, which is
based on the criteria described in [40 C.F.R.] § 300.430(e)(9)(iii).
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55 Fed. Reg. at 8,718.

B. The Nayy's Fourth Five-Year Review and Draft Addendum
As the Navy acknowledged, a five-year review is required in this case because
ongoing and completed remedial actions have left contaminants in place at HPNS
above concentrations that would allow for unlimited use and unrestricted exposure.
Fourth FYR at 1-2. In the Fourth FYR, the Navy stated that "a significant portion of
the radiological survey and remediation work completed to date was not reliable
because of manipulation and/or falsification of data by one of its radiological
contractors." Id. at 7-3. Consequently, the Navy did not complete a long-term
protectiveness evaluation of the radiological Remediation Goals in the Fourth FYR.
Id. Instead, the Navy proposed to issue this Draft Addendum to evaluate the longterm protectiveness of the Remediation Goals for soil using two models: (1)
RESRAD-ONSITE ("RESRAD"); and (2) EPA's Preliminary Remediation Goal
("PRG") Calculator for radiation risk to human health. Id. 1
The Draft Addendum enclosed a Battelle report dated August 7, 2019, which
was entitled "Hunters Point Naval Shipyard - Estimated Excess Cancer Risks and
Dose Equivalent Rates from Resident Exposures to Radionuclide-Containing Soils
Report" (hereafter "Battelle Report"). Table 1 of the Battelle Report lists current soil
Remediation Goals from the 2006 HPNS Action Memorandum for 11 Radionuclides
of Concern. Battelle Report at 3. Footnote 2 to Table 1 states that the current soil
Remediation Goal for Radium-226 "is 1.0 pCi/g above background based on an
agreement with the EPA." Id. at 3, Table 1, n.2.
The Battelle Report claims that the Remediation Goals presented in Table 1
were intended to be ''the most conservative available and are added to the site- and
radionuclide-specific background." Id. at 3. These Remediation Goals "were derived
considering the 1991 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) decay-corrected
preliminary remediation goals (PRG) (EPA, 1991), past action memoranda, an
agreement with EPA for radium (Ra)-226 f 26Ra) and the 2004 Historical Radiological
Assessment (HRA)." Id.

II.

SUMMARY OF COMMENTS

The Draft Addendum to the Fourth FYR, which is intended to evaluate and
determine if the HPNS remedy is and will be protective of human health and the
environment, comes at an opportune moment. The Navy has recently determined that
a significant portion of the radiological survey and remediation work completed to
date at HPNS was not reliable because one of its radiological contractors manipulated
A lead agency should complete a five-year review addendum for a remedy when the
protectiveness determination was deferred in a prior five-year review in order to
collect additional information. See Five-Year Reviews, Frequently Asked Questions
(FAQs) and Answers at 2, OSWER 9355.7-21.
1

Derek J. Robinson, BRAC Environmental Coordinator
Department of the Navy
Page4
and/or falsified data. This HPNS survey and remediation work will now need to be
redone by the Navy and its new contractors. In its comments on the draft Fourth FYR,
EPA emphasized the need for the Navy, as part of the protectiveness determinations
required in the Fourth FYR, to conduct an updated review of the remedial goals in the
Record of Decision ("ROD") for each Parcel to determine whether the remedy, upon
completion, will be protective of human health. Therefore, the Draft Addendum to the
Fourth FYR affords the Navy the opportunity to reevaluate its remedial goals to
determine whether they are protective.
Instead, the Navy has ignored this opportunity to chart a new course for the
HPNS remedy. The Navy failed to conduct an evaluation of the ROD's radiological
remediation goals for soil. As a consequence, the Draft Addendum simply accepted,
without any further review or evaluation, the Remediation Goals adopted in the
Navy's 2006 Action Memorandum. The Navy failed to consider adoption of EPA's
current Preliminary Remediation Goals for radionuclides, which are 897 times more
protective than the Navy's Remediation Goal for Radium-226, a primary radionuclide
of concern at HPNS. Furthermore, in the risk calculations included in the Draft
Addendum, the Navy failed to take into account that radionuclide risks are not
estimated based on an individual radionuclide or radionuclide decay chains, but are
instead the sum of the risks from all radionuclides. Moreover, the Navy also failed to
consider the risk posed by the consumption of homegrown produce. Despite ignoring
this risk, the Navy's own calculations show that the combined risk of exposure to
Radium-226 and Thorium-232 exceeds the upper bound lifetime cancer risk to an
individual of 1 X 1o-4 established under the NCP to protect human health. If the risks
from the consumption of homegrown produce are included, the combined exposure to
Radium-226 and Thorium-232 would subject future residents at HPNS to an increased
cancer risk of 1.52 in 1,000, which exceeds the NCP' s protective standard by an order
of magnitude.
Under these circumstances, the Navy's Remediation Goals are not protective
of human health. Consequently, consistent with the NCP and EPA guidance,
Greenaction urges the Navy to: (1) adopt EPA's current Preliminary Remediation
Goals for the 11 Radionuclides of Concern at HPNS; and (2) amend the RODs for
HPNS Parcels to ensure that the remedies can meet the revised, more protective
remediation goals. In addition, Greenaction requests that the Navy stop its
unwarranted reliance on soil covers and land use restrictions in the remediation of soil
contaminated with radiological waste. Instead of leaving contaminated soil on site,
the Navy must conduct a thorough radiological survey at HPNS, and remove and
properly dispose ofHPNS soil contaminated with radiological waste. Finally,
Greenaction requests the Navy to revise its Protectiveness Determinations in its Fourth
FYR to properly characterize the protectiveness of its remedies.

III.

DISCUSSION OF COMMENTS
A. The Nayy Should Revise Its Soil Remediation Goals to Adopt EPA's
Current Residential Preliminary Remediation Goals for Soil.
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In the preamble to the final NCP, EPA stated its policy that it will not reopen
remedy selection decisions contained in a ROD unless a "new or modified
requirement calls into question the protectiveness of the selected remedy." 55 Fed.
Reg. at 8,757. The preamble explained that "a policy of freezing ARARs at the time
of ROD signing will not sacrifice protection of human health and the environment
because the remedy will be reviewed for protectiveness every five years, considering
new or modified requirements at that point, or more frequently, if there is reason to
believe that the remedy is no longer protective of health and environment." ld. at
8,758. In order to assess the protectiveness of a remedy in a five-year review, the lead
agency should examine whether "the exposure assumptions, toxicity data, cleanup
levels, and remedial action objectives (RAOs) used at the time of the remedy selection
[are] still valid." Comprehensive FYR Guidance at 4-1. For an assumption based on a
clean-up level, the lead agency should ask the following two questions: "What is the
basis for each cleanup level identified in the ROD (e.g., risk-based or promulgated
standards as ARARs)? Have there been changes to the basis of the cleanup levels?"
ld. at 4-5.

In the Fourth FYR, the Navy stated:
The Navy is planning to evaluate the radiological RGs identified in
the RODs using current guidance to ensure the long-term
protectiveness of the radiological remedies (see further information
in Section 7). As part of this evaluation, the Navy will identify any
relevant changes in toxicity or other contaminant characteristics
that may result in post ROD changes.
Fourth FYR at 6-12. In Section 7 of the Fourth FYR, the Navy stated that it "is in the
process of conducting a long-term protectiveness evaluation of the ROD radiological
RGs." ld. at 7-3. In its comments on the draft Fourth FYR, EPA emphasized that "the
protectiveness determinations requires an updated review of the remedial goals in the
ROD to determine whether the remedy, upon completion, will be protective of human
health." Letter from Lily Lee, EPA's RPM, to Derek Robinson, Navy's BRAC
Environmental Coordinator, dated May 25, 2019, at 2, ~4. However, in the Draft
Addendum, the Navy did not conduct an evaluation of the ROD's radiological
remedial goals for soil. Instead, the Draft Addendum simply reiterated, without any
further review or evaluation, the Remediation Goals adopted in the 2006 Action
Memorandum. Battelle Report at 3, Table 1.
According to the Navy's own calculations, which exclude the risk posed by
consumption of homegrown produce, the excess cancer risk from exposure to both
Radium-226 and Thorium-232 at the Navy's Remediation Goals exceeds the upper
bound lifetime cancer risk to an individual of 1 x 1o-4 established under the NCP to
protect human health. See Section A.1. below. If the Navy had included the
consumption of homegrown produce as a risk pathway in its risk calculations, the
combined risk from Radium-226 and Thorium-232 would exceed the upper bound
lifetime cancer risk by an order of magnitude. See Section A.2. below. Under these
circumstances, the Navy's Remediation Goals are not protective of human health.
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EPA's current residential Preliminary Remediation Goals for soil are substantially
more stringent than the Navy's soil Remediation Goals, which were derived from
EPA's 1991 Preliminary Remediation Goals. See Section A.3. below. Because the
calculated risk associated with the Navy's soil Remediation Goals is outside ofEPA's
risk range under CERCLA, the Navy should adopt EPA's more protective residential
Preliminary Remediation Goals for soil, and should amend the RODs for Parcels at
HPNS to adopt remedies that can meet the more protective Remediation Goals. See
Section A.4. below.
1.

The Nayy's Remediation Goals for Soil Are Not Protective ofHuman
Health.

In the Draft Addendum, the Navy used two models to evaluate the long-term
protectiveness ofthe soil radiological remedial goals: RESRAD and EPA's PRG
Calculator. Draft Addendum at 3-4. For both of these calculations, the Navy
excluded the risk posed by the consumption of homegrown produce at HPNS. Battelle
Report at 6 (RESRAD modifications); 9 (PRG Calculator modifications). According
to the Battelle Report, the total risks, without considering the risk posed by the
consumption of homegrown produce, were calculated as follows:
TABLE 1- NAVY's ESTIMATED EXCESS CANCER RISKS
(Excluding Risk of Homegrown Produce)
Radio nuclide

Americium-241
Cesium-137
Cobalt-60
Europium-152
Europium-154
Plutonium-239
Radium-226
Strontium-90
Thorium-232
Tritium (H-3)
Uranium-235

Total Risk
(RESRAD) 2
7.34E-07
3.22E-06
1.74E-06
5.57E-06
7.88E-06
5.99E-07
1.25E-04
8.38E-08
2.75E-04
1.16E-08
1.72E-06

Total Risk
(PRG Calculatol"}3
5.95E-07
1.98E-06
1.09E-06
3.36E-06
4.87E-06
6.71E-07
7.87E-05
7.87E-08
1.72E-04
9.61E-06
l.OOE-06

The Battelle Report concluded that the resultant risks under either RESRAD or
the PRG Calculator "for individual radionuclides or radionuclide decay chains are
protective for residential exposures to site soils that are uniformly contaminated at the
remedial goal levels." Battelle Report at 8, 11 (emphasis added). However,
radionuclide risks are not estimated based on an individual radionuclide or
radionuclide decay chain. As EPA has explained: "The total incremental lifetime
2

3

Battelle Report at 7-8 (Table 3).
Battelle Report at 11 (Table 5).
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cancer risk attributed to radiation exposure is estimated as the sum ofthe risks from all
radio nuclides in all exposure pathways." See "Radiation Risk Assessment at
CERCLA Sites: Q & A" at 25 (Q28), EPA 540-R-012013 (May 2013) (emphasis
added) (hereafter "Radiation Risk Assessment Q&A"). In fact, "excess cancer risks
from both radionuclides and chemical carcinogens should be summed to provide an
estimate of the combined risk presented by all carcinogenic contaminants." ld. (Q29).
As EPA stated in its comments regarding the Navy's draft Fourth FYR,
"EPA's guidance for radiological cleanup states that generally 1 x 104 excess cancer
risk is an upper bound for risk management decisions." Letter from Lily Lee, EPA's
RPM, to Derek Robinson, Navy's BRAC Environmental Coordinator, dated May 25,
2019, at 4, ~11. According to the Navy's own calculations based on RESRAD, the
excess cancer risk from Radium-226 (1.25E-04) and Thorium-232 (2.75E-04) both
exceed 1 x 104 ; the excess cancer risk from both radionuclides totals 4.0 x 104 . See
Table 1 above; Battelle Report at 8. Similarly, based on the Navy's calculations using
the PRG Calculator, the excess cancer risk from Thorium-232 alone exceeds 1 x 104 ,
and the excess cancer risk from both Radium-226 and Thorium-232 totals 2.5 x 104 .
See Table 1 above; Battelle Report at 11. These excess cancer risks, calculated by the
Navy under either RESRAD or the PRG Calculator, exceed the upper bound lifetime
cancer risk to an individual of 1 x 10-4 established under the NCP to protect human
health. 40 C.P.R. § 300.430(e)(2)(i)(A)(2).
2.

The Nayy's Risk Calculations Understate the Risk of Excess Cancers by
Omitting the Risk from Consumption of Plants.

The Battelle Report explained the inputs selected by the Navy to calculate
excess cancer risks using RESRAD:
Deed restrictions will be implemented to restrict the growth of plants in
HPNS soils that are intended for consumption. Residents are therefore
not anticipated to consume plants, meats, milk, aquatic foods or
drinking water produced on HPNS and these pathways were turned off.
Battelle Report at 6. Similarly, the Report described the following modification made
by the Navy to an input for the PRG Calculator:
The Toggle All box was unchecked to deselect produce for inclusion in
the risk estimates based on stated restrictions on the use of homegrown
produce using HPNS soils.
ld. at 9 (italics in original).
In its comments regarding the Navy's draft Fourth FYR, EPA addressed the
need for the Navy to perform an updated evaluation of long-term protectiveness
related to cleanup levels, recommending that the Navy's ''technical memorandum
assess and show the concentrations that would be associated with 1 x 104 excess
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cancer risk in an unrestricted scenario." Letter from Lily Lee, EPA's RPM, to Derek
Robinson, Navy's BRAC Environmental Coordinator, dated May 25, 2019, at 4, ~11.
Instead of responding to EPA's recommendation, the Navy chose to exclude the
homegrown produce risk from its risk calculations. Notably, the Navy's exclusion of
the risk from homegrown produce is flatly inconsistent with the Navy's own
statements about cleanup actions for radiological contaminants. At a Citizens
Advisory Committee meeting at HPNS on August 26,2019, the Navy provided a fact
sheet to the public entitled "Facts About Durable Covers and Protecting Health at
Hunters Point." See Attachment 1. In the fact sheet, the Navy stated: "The cleanup
actions for radiological contaminants do not rely on the durable cover; instead the
cleanup goals for these contaminants assume the durable cover is not present."
Emphasis added. The Navy cannot represent to the public that its cleanup actions for
radiological contaminants do not rely on durable covers at the same time that the
Navy's risk calculations for radionuclides intentionally exclude the risk from
homegrown produce based on the unsupported assumption that "deed restrictions will
be implemented to restrict the growth of plants in HPNS soils that are intended for
consumption." Battelle Report at 6.
In fact, the Institutional Controls selected for Parcels at HPNS do not fully
support the Navy's assumption. For example, the Explanation of Significant
Differences ("ESD") for Parcel G, which contains language similar to other HPNS
RODs, established the following Institutional Control:
The following activities are prohibited throughout Parcel G:
Growing vegetables, fruits, or any edible items in native soil for
human consumption. Plants for human consumption may be grown if
they are planted in raised beds (above the CERCLA-approved cover)
containing non-native soil. Trees producing edible fruit (including
trees producing edible nuts) may also be planted provided they are
grown in containers with a bottom that prevents the roots from
penetrating the native soil.
Parcel G ESD at 8 (April18, 2017) (emphasis added). 4 Therefore, the Institutional
Controls for Parcel G and some other HPNS Parcels expressly permit residents to
grow plants for human consumption in raised beds.
The Covenant to Restrict the Use ofProperty for Parcels UC-1 and UC-2, which
was recorded by the San Francisco Assessor-Recorder at the Navy's request on
September 16, 2015, contains the same Institutional Control language as the ESD for
Parcel G. Similarly, the Parcel E ROD contains the same Institutional Control
language as the ESD for Parcel G. Record of Decision for Parcel E (December 2103)
at 2-56. We note that the Amended ROD for Parcel B does prohibit "growing
vegetables or fruits in native soil for human consumption." Amended Parcel B Record
of Decision (January 14, 2009) at 12-11.

4
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Moreover, plants grown in raised beds will expose residents to any
contaminants in the HPNS soil. In an August 2019 report entitled "Plant Uptake of
Radionuclides and Toxic Chemicals from Contaminated Soils Below a Shallow Soil
Cover," William Bianchi, PhD, a retired USDA soil physicist, concluded:
The extensive depth of roots, uptake of contaminants into plants, and
various mechanisms of hydraulic redistribution allow vegetation to
access materials such as toxic chemicals and radionuclides deep within
soil layers. Once accessed, plants are capable of transferring those
materials through their roots to the surface, providing several pathways
for human exposure.
Bianchi Report at 1 (at http://committeetobridgethegap.org/publications/.)
Because the current Institutional Controls in place in the RODs for Parcels at
HPNS expressly allow residents to grow and consume their own produce, the Navy
should have included the risk from homegrown produce in its risk calculations. As the
risks in Table 2 below illustrate, if produce consumption is included as a risk pathway
under the PRG Calculator, the total risks are substantially higher for Radium-226 and
Thorium-232.
TABLE 2 - COMPARISON OF ESTIMATED EXCESS CANCER RISKS
(PRG Calculator - Assessing Risk of Consumption of Homegrown Produce)
Radionuclide
Radium-226
Thorium-232

Total Risk Excluding
Homegrown Produce5
7.87E-05
1.72E-04

Total Risk Including
Homegrown Produce6
5.48E-04
9.74E-04

Significantly, according to the PRG Calculator, including produce
consumption as a risk pathway results in a total excess cancer risk of 1.52 x 1o-3 from
both Radium-226 and Thorium-232. Consistent with EPA's guidance, the total risk
represents the sum of the risks from both radionuclides. See Radiation Risk
Assessment Q & A at 25 (Q28). This total risk exceeds - by an order of magnitude the upper bound lifetime cancer risk to an individual of 1 x 10-4 established under the
NCP to protect human health. 40 C.P.R.§ 300.430(e)(2)(i)(A)(2).

Battelle Report at 11 (Table 5). Note: these calculations exclude the risk from
consumption of homegrown produce.
6 United States Environmental Protection Agency: Preliminary Remediation Goals
for Radionuclide Contaminants at Superfund Sites (date accessed 8-31-19). See
https://epa-prgs.oml.gov/cgi-binlradionuclides/r_prg search. Note: this risk
calculation is based on the same inputs as the Battelle Report at page 9 except that the
risk calculation includes the consumption of homegrown produce.
5
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3.

EPA's Current Residential Preliminary Remediation Goals for Soil Are
Substantially More Stringent than the Navy's Soil Remediation Goals.

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(2), all guidelines, rules, regulations, and
criteria that are applicable to remedial actions at facilities at which hazardous
substances are located shall also be applicable to federal facilities such as HPNS. "No
department ... of the United States may adopt or utilize such guidelines, rules,
regulations, or criteria which are inconsistent with the guidelines, rules, regulations, or
criteria established by" EPA under CERCLA. ld. In a 2006 Action Memorandum for
this site, the Navy adopted Remediation Goals for soil that were derived considering
the 1991 EPA preliminary remediation goals. Battelle Report at 3. According to the
PRG Frequently Asked Questions, "the PRG database is updated when new toxicity
values are presented by the EPA. This is generally done monthly; however, there may
be times when more than one month passes without the release of updated toxicity
values." PRG FAQ #7; see https://epa-prgs.ornl.gov/radionuclides/faq.html. The
Navy has not explained why it chose in 2006 to use EPA's soil preliminary
remediation goals from 1991 rather than using the soil preliminary remediation goals
that existed in 2006. As shown in Table 3 below, however, EPA's current residential
Preliminary Remediation Goals for soil applicable in 2019, calculated at a 10-6 risk
level, are up to two orders of magnitude more stringent (i.e., more protective) than the
Navy's Remediation Goals. For example, EPA's residential Preliminary Remediation
Goal for Radium-226 is 897 times more protective than the Navy's Remediation Goal.
See D. Hirsch et al., Hunter's Point Shipyard Cleanup Used Outdated and Grossly
Non-Protective Cleanup Standards at 5 (at
htt,p://committeetobridgethegap.org/publicationsD (hereafter "Hirsch, Non-Protective
Cleanup Standards"). Similarly, EPA's current standard for Thorium-232 is 971 times
more protective than the Navy's Remediation Goal. ld.
TABLE 3- COMPARISON OF SOIL REMEDIATION GOALS
Radionuclide

Navy's Residential Soil
Remediation Goals (pCi/g)

Americium-241
Cesium-137
Cobalt-60
Europium-152
Europium-154
Plutonium-239
Radium-226
Strontium-90
Thorium-232
Tritium (H-3)
Uranium-235

1.36
0.113
0.252
0.13
0.23
2.59
1.0
0.331
1.69
2.28
0.195

7

EPA's 2019 Residential
Preliminary Remediation
Goals for Soil (oCile;)'
0.0104
0.0303
0.00806
0.0208
0.0195
0.00615
0.00182
0.00361
0.00174
0.0612
0.00623

United States Environmental Protection Agency: Preliminary Remediation Goals
for Radionuclide Contaminants at Superfund Sites (date accessed 8-28-19). See
https://epa-prgs.ornl.gov/cgi-binlradionuclides/rprg_search.
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4.

The Navy's Five-Year Review Should Recommend the Adoption of
EPA's More Protective Residential Soil Preliminary Remediation Goals
and ROD Amendments to Meet the More Protective Remediation Goals.

The Battelle Report stated that the Remediation Goals for soil "were intended
to be the most conservative available." Battelle Report at 3 and Table 1. On the
contrary, these Remediation Goals are far from the "most conservative available." In
fact, the Navy's Draft Addendum shows that the Remediation Goals are not protective
of human health. Even if the Navy excludes the risk of consumption of homegrown
produce, calculations from both RESRAD and PRG Calculator demonstrate that the
Navy's Remediation goals are not protective because the combined risks from both
Radium-226 and Thorium-232 exceed the upper bound lifetime cancer risk to an
individual of 1 x 10-4 established under the NCP. Id. at 7-8 (Table 3); 11 (Table 5).
Furthermore, if the Navy had properly accounted for the additional risk of
consumption of homegrown produce, the Navy's Remediation Goals would pose a
total excess cancer risk of 1.52 x 1o-3 for Radium-226 and Thorium-232 combined.
See Table 2 above - Comparison of Estimated Excess Cancer Risks (PRG CalculatorAssessing Risk of Consumption of Homegrown Produce).
When the proposed remedy is no longer protective, EPA guidance provides the
following path forward for the Navy:
For example, based on revised risk information for a specific chemical,
a new standard (e.g., more stringent MCL for a chemical) may result in
a situation where the cleanup level to be achieved by the original
remedy would pose a 1o-3 cancer risk. In that circumstance, the fiveyear review could recommend that a new cleanup level based on the
new standard be adopted and, if necessary, that the remedy be
modified.
Comprehensive FYR Guidance at 4-6, 4-7. EPA's guidance also sets out a flowchart
to evaluate changes in standards. Id. at G-4, Exhibit G-1. If the new currently
calculated risk associated with an old standard is not within EPA's risk range, the "old
standard is considered not protective" and the "newly revised (protective) standard
should be adopted." Id. Moreover, the lead agency should determine whether the
remedy in the ROD can meet the new standards and recommend follow-up actions.
Id.; see also State of Ohio, 997 F.2d at 1535 (EPA asserting that a five-year review
may result in a new remedial action "when the review reveals that the remedy is no
longer protective") (emphasis in original).
Adoption of EPA's current Preliminary Remediation Goals for soil is
particularly appropriate at HPNS for several reasons. First, the Navy has determined
that a significant portion of the radiological survey and remediation work completed to
date was not reliable because of its contractor's manipulation and/or falsification of
data. Fourth FYR at 7-3. As a result, extensive survey and remediation work will
need to be redone at HPNS. Id. This Fourth Five-Year Review requires the Navy and
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EPA to conduct a long-term protectiveness evaluation ofthe RODs' radiological
Remediation Goals. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 9621(c); 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(4)(ii). The
Navy now has the opportunity to push the "reset button" on the remediation ofHPNS
in order to regain the public's trust in this process. Second, if the Navy had included
the risks associated with the consumption of homegrown produce, the PRG Calculator
reveals that the use of the Navy's Remediation Goals would pose a total excess cancer
risk of 1.52 x 10"3, i.e., an increased cancer risk of 1.52 in 1,000, which exceeds EPA's
uppermost risk range by an order of magnitude. Because the Navy's Remediation
Goals are not protective, the Navy should adopt EPA's current, more protective
Preliminary Remediation Goals. Third, the Navy's Remediation Goals, which were
adopted in a 2006 Action Plan, were inexplicably derived from EPA's preliminary
remediation goals from 1991. Battelle Report at 3. In other words, the Navy's current
soil Remediation Goals in 2019 are based on a 2006 Action Plan that was derived
from outdated risk exposure factors from 15 years earlier. If the Navy seeks to assure
the public that its Remediation Goals for soil are "intended to be the most conservative
available," it should not cling to outmoded, unprotective standards from 1991 to guide
the extensive survey and remediation work that remains to be done at HPNS. Finally,
the Battelle Report states that the current soil Remediation Goal for Radium-226 of
1.0pCilg above background "is based on an agreement with the EPA." Id. at 3, Table
1, n.2. However, neither the Navy nor EPA has provided any additional information
regarding the basis for this agreement; neither the Navy nor EPA has shown the public
that this Remediation Goal for Radium-226 is protective of human health. 8
Significantly, EPA's current residential Preliminary Remediation Goal of0.0018
pCi/g for Radium-226 in soil is 897 times more protective than the Navy's
Remediation Goal of 1.633 pCilg. See Table 3 above - Comparison of Soil
Remediation Goals; Hirsch, Non-Protective Cleanup Standards at 5.
In determining revised remediation goals for soil, the Navy should use the 10-6 risk
level "as the point of departure." 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(e)(2)(i)(A)(2). The most
protective end of the NCP's risk range is particularly appropriate for HPNS given that
the State of California has identified Bayview as a disadvantaged community
"disproportionately affected by environmental pollution and other hazards that can
lead to negative public health effects, exposure, or environmental degradation." See
htt,ps://calepa.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2017/04/SB-535-DesignationFinal.pdf; https://oehha.ca.gov/calenviroscreen/sb53 5 (OEHHA' s disadvantaged
communities map). Accordingly, the Navy's Fourth FYR should recommend: (1) the
adoption ofEPA's more protective residential soil Preliminary Remediation Goals
(see Table 3 above); and (2) after consideration ofthe nine evaluation criteria
established by 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(e)(9)(iii), the amendment of RODs for HPNS
Parcels to select remedies that can meet the more protective Remediation Goals.

Notably, the ROD for Parcel E identifies Radium-226 as a primary radionuclide of
concern. ROD for Parcel E (December 2013) at 2-16.
8
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B. The Navy's Remediation at HPNS Should Not Rely on Institutional
Controls Such as Soil Covers and Land Use Controls for Long-lived
Radionuclides of Concern.
In a fact sheet entitled "Facts about Durable Covers and Protecting Health at
Hunters Point" presented to the public at a Citizens Advisory Committee meeting at
HPNS on August 26, 2019, the Navy stated: "The cleanup actions for radiological
contaminants do not rely on the durable cover; instead the cleanup goals for these
contaminants assume the durable cover is not present." See Attachment 1. Contrary
to the approach announced in the fact sheet, however, the Navy has taken a completely
different tack in its remedy selection for IR-07/18, which is a part of Parcel B, and for
Parcel E.
In the Navy's Fourth FYR, the Navy described the remediation ofiR-07/18, in
which radiological waste will be left in place in soils below one foot and a cover will
be an essential part of the remedy:
In 2010 a MARSSIM Class 1 survey was completed for the entire
surface ofiR-07/18, and the top 1 foot of soil was remediated to levels
specified in the Amended ROD to ensure a radiologically clean surface
before the cover remedy was applied. The constructed cover over the
portion ofiR-07/18 (within the radiological ARIC) prevents exposure
to radionuclides in accordance with the RAOs. CDPH completed
further surface scans at IR-07/18. CDPH concluded that there was no
evidence or indication of radiological health and safety concerns based
on surface gamma radiation in the surveyed areas ofiR-07/18 (CDPH,
2013). Soil data at this site was not evaluated because residual
radiological contamination is assumed to be present in deeper soils,
the protective cover was designed to address that residual
contamination, and the design and integrity of the final soil cover was
verified by CDPH.
Fourth FYR at 6-7 (emphasis added). Thus, the Navy intends to prevent potential
exposure to radionuclides in soil within IR-07118 by "access restrictions," enclosing
the site with a fence with locked gates, maintaining a durable cover to prevent contact
with underlying soil, and relying on land use restrictions that will be incorporated into
a covenant to restrict the use of the property. Id. at 6-8.
Similarly, the remedy selected for radiological impacted media for Parcel E
calls for the removal of soil, sediment, or debris with radioactive contamination
exceeding remediation goals, with soil excavation depth at IR-02 and IR-03 on Parcel
E generally limited to the upper one foot. ROD for Parcel E (December 2013) at 2-39.
The Navy intends to construct a two-foot soil cover to prevent exposure to remaining
contaminants and will impose Institutional Controls to limit the use of land or restrict
activities that take place within the area. Id. The Navy will conduct "deeper soil
excavation at IR-02 and IR-03, if necessary, to ensure that the residual radiological
risk (i.e., the incremental excess cancer risks from exposure to radionuclides in soil) at
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the final ground surface (following installation of a demarcation layer and soil cover)
is acceptable." Id. at 2-53.
Because the Navy's chosen remedy does not allow for unlimited use and
unrestricted exposure at the site, the NCP requires the Navy to conduct this five-year
review. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(t)(4)(ii). "When an IC [Institutional Control] is a
component of a remedial action, the current and long-term effectiveness of that IC
should be evaluated and relevant information about that IC should be included as part
ofthe effectiveness determination." See "Recommended Evaluation of Institutional
Controls: Supplement to the 'Comprehensive Five-Year Review Guidance,"' at 2,
OSWER Directive 9355.7-18 (September 13, 2011) (hereafter "Recommended IC
Evaluation"). The five-year review may also "recommend the need for additional
evaluation and/or follow-up actions included as highlighted issues and
recommendations." Id.

In an August 2019 report entitled "Bioturbation, Erosion, and Seismic Activity
Make Shallow Soil Covers Ineffective at Isolation Contamination," Howard G.
Wilshire, PhD, a former Senior Geologist at the U.S. Geological Survey, addressed
whether placing two or three feet of clean soil across large portions of the HPNS site
could effectively prevent exposure of contaminants to future residents and users of the
site. Wilshire Report at 1 (at http://committeetobridgethegap.org/publicationsD. He
concluded: "there is strong evidence that suggests thin soil covers are incapable of
withstanding certain processes such as bioturbation, erosion, and seismic activity
which, over time, could potentially compromise their efficacy and durability." Id. In
particular, Dr. Wilshire listed both burrowing animals and ant species common in the
Bay Area that could cause extensive damage to soil covers. Id. at 4-5, 7-8. This type
of damage is not hypothetical; it has been documented at other contaminated sites
including the Hanford Nuclear Reservation, Rocky Flats Plant, Los Alamos National
Laboratory, and the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. ld. at 3.
In addition, as the Navy stated in the Historical Radiological Assessment for
the Hunters Point Shipyard ("HRA"), the HPNS lies between two major faults, the San
Andreas and the Hayward faults, which "are considered active and likely to experience
a major event (Richter of magnitude 6.7 or greater) within the next 200 years." HRA
at 3-3, 3-4. Consequently, HPNS "is situated in a fault zone that can be expected to
experience violent ground shaking and possible liquefaction of the fill material on
which much of the shipyard was constructed during a large magnitude earthquake on
any one of the surrounding faults." ld. at 3-4. In the case of a seismic event, Dr.
Wilshire stated this concern: "intense shaking and possible liquefaction could very
well expose contaminated soils beneath the thin soil cover." Wilshire Report at 10.
Furthermore, an EPA report has documented erosion as a significant problem
for a number of cover systems. Id. Dr. Wilshire noted that erosion may present a
particular problem at HPNS, which consists of substantial fill material. ld. Finally,
plant root intrusion can both transport and disperse waste out of a disposal site, and
cause physical damage to a cover barrier. Id. at 9.
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As part of analyzing Institutional Controls in making the protectiveness
determination in the five-year review, the Navy "should keep in mind that ICs are
generally protective when they are implemented and effective in the long-term."
Recommended IC Evaluation at 3. At Parcel E, the ROD identified, based on soil
sample results, two primary radionuclides of concern: Cesium-13 7 and Radium-226.
ROD for Parcel E (December 2013) at 2-16. According to the Navy's HRA, Cesium137 has a half-life of30.1 years and Radium-226 has a half-life of 1,599 years. HRA,
Table 4-2 at 1, 2.
David J. Kappelman, an EPA health physicist, filed a declaration in support of
the United States' supplemental sentencing memorandum regarding the actions of
defendant Justin Hubbard at HPNS. In his declaration, Mr. Kappelman stated:

Because of the possible adverse health effects from ionizing
radiation and the long decay periods (half-lives) for many
radionuclides, removal and off-site disposal is considered the
most effective option for most ofthe radioactive contaminants
found at HPNS. For example, the half-life ofradium-226, the
radionuclide left behind by Mr. Hubbard on the North Pier is
1,600 years. Physical removal of radioactive materials ensures
that the potential for diffuse radioactivity is reduced to levels
that meet or are below clean up goals.
Declaration ofDavid L. Kappelman in Support of Government's Supplemental
Sentencing Memorandum re: Lack of Sentencing Disparity and Risk of Harm, ~8
(emphasis added); see Attachment 2 (hereafter "Kappelman Decl."). Physical removal
and proper off-site disposal of radioactive waste located at HPNS is particularly
necessary given climate change and the threat of rising sea levels, which would
inundate radioactive waste left in place at HPNS.
New York State has issued guidelines providing that the use of a clean soil
cover may be acceptable as part of a remedy for soil contaminated with short-lived
isotopes, "assuming that restrictions to land use are used until the radionuclides no
longer pose a threat." Wilshire Report at 1. That New York State guideline would
likely rule out the use of a soil cover in this case, in which the soil is contaminated
with long-lived radionuclides. Id. Similarly, the NCP lists "long-term effectiveness
and permanence" as a critical factor in selecting a remedy: "Alternatives shall be
assessed for the long-term effectiveness and permanence they afford, along with the
degree of certainty that the alternative will prove successful." 40 C.F.R. §
300.430(e)(9)(iii)(C). In particular, the NCP requires the lead agency to consider the
"[a]dequacy and reliability of controls such as containment systems and institutional
controls that are necessary to manage treatment residuals and untreated waste." Id. at
§ 300.430(e)(9)(iii)(C)(2); see also Recommended IC Evaluation at 6 (in the five-year
review, EPA should consider the long-term effectiveness and enforceability of
Institutional Controls).

Derek J. Robinson, BRAC Environmental Coordinator
Department of the Navy
Page 16
Given the risks posed to the Navy's proposed two-foot soil cover by
bioturbation, seismic activity, plant intrusion, erosion, and rising sea levels, the Navy
and EPA should reject the use of a soil cover because it will not prevent exposure to
soil contaminated with radiological waste in the long term. Considering that Radium226, a primary radionuclide of concern at Parcel E, has a half-life of 1,599 years, the
proposed use of a two-foot soil cover will not protect human health against the effects
of radioactive contamination at HPNS in the long term. Furthermore, with respect to
the enforceability of the Institutional Controls to restrict land uses, the California
Department of Toxic Substances Control does not have an unlimited budget for
inspectors to monitor and enforce land use controls at HPNS. Even if it did, the
concept that a land use covenant at HPNS could afford effective and enforceable
protection in the long term, i.e., for the next two millennia, strains credulity. Because
the Navy cannot demonstrate the long-term effectiveness of a soil cover to prevent
human exposure to long-lived radionuclides in the soil at HPNS, the Navy should not
rely on soil covers and proprietary controls as part of the radiological remedy. As Mr.
Kappelman declared, "removal and off-site disposal is considered the most effective
option for most of the radioactive contaminants found at HPNS" to ensure that ''the
potential for diffuse radioactivity is reduced to levels that meet or are below clean up
goals." Kappelman Decl., ~8. Instead ofleaving radioactive, contaminated soil on
site at HPNS, the Navy must conduct a thorough radiological survey at HPNS, and
remove and properly dispose of HPNS soil contaminated with radiological waste.
C. The Nayy Should Revise the Protectiveness Determinations in Section 8 of
Its Fourth Five-Year Review.
In its Fourth FYR, the Navy included a Protectiveness Statement in Section 8
for each site or parcel at HPNS where the remedial action is either currently underway
or is demonstrated to be complete. Fourth FYR at 8-1 to 8-9. The Navy concluded
that the remedy is "protective" at IR 07/18, "will be protective" at Parcels B-1, B-2, C,
E, and E-2, and is "short-term protective" at Parcels D-1, D-2, G, UC-1, UC-2, and
UC-3. Id. As detailed below, the Navy should revise its Protectiveness Statement in
the Fourth FYR to be consistent with EPA's guidance. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(2).
In 2012, EPA issued a guidance entitled "Clarifying the Use of Protectiveness
Determinations for Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act Five-Year Reviews," OSWER 9200.2-111 (9-13-12) (hereafter
"Protectiveness Determinations Guidance"). To assess the protectiveness of the
remedy, EPA reiterated that the reviewing agency needs to answer the following three
questions:
Question A: Is the remedy functioning as intended by the decision
documents?
Question B: Are the exposure assumptions, toxicity data, cleanup
levels, and RAOs used at the time of the remedy still valid?
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Question C: Has any other information come to light that could call
into question the protectiveness of the remedy?
Id. at 2.
EPA explained that a determination of"protective" is typically used when the
answers to the questions A, B, and C "provide sufficient data and documentation to
conclude that the remedy is functioning as intended and all human and ecological risks
are currently under control and are anticipated to be under control in the future." ld. at
2-3. The determination of"will be protective" is appropriate for remedies where
construction activities are ongoing, the answers to the questions A, B, and C "provide
sufficient data and documentation to conclude that the human and ecological
exposures are currently under control and no acceptable risks are occurring," and ''the
remedy under construction is anticipated to be protective upon completion and no
remedy implementation or performance issues have been identified." Id. at 3-4. A
determination of "short-term protective" is typically used when the answers to the
questions A, B, and C "provide sufficient data and documentation to conclude that the
human and ecological exposures are currently under control and no unacceptable
exposures are occurring. However, the data and/or documentation review also raise
issues that could impact future protectiveness or remedy performance but not current
protectiveness." ld. at 3. EPA's guidance recommended that the following language
be used by a lead agency when drafting a protectiveness determination of"short-term
protective" in a five-year review report:
The remedy at OU X currently protects human health and the
environment because (describe the elements ofthe remedy that protect
human health and the environment in the short-term). However, in
order for the remedy to be protective in the long-term, the following
actions need to be taken (describe the actions needed) to ensure
protectiveness.
ld. at 3 (italicized in original). 9
In its Fourth FYR, the Navy stated that "a significant portion of the
radiological survey and remediation work completed to date was not reliable because
of manipulation and/or falsification of data by one of its radiological contractors."
Fourth FYR at 7-3. Under these circumstances, the Navy does not have reliable data
to respond to Questions B and C with respect to the remedies that the Navy selected
for each site or parcel at HPNS. Accordingly, the Navy should follow EPA's

For some Parcels at HPNS, the Navy could also determine that "protectiveness
deferred" is appropriate if the available information to answer the questions A, B, and
C "does not provide sufficient data and documentation to conclude that the human and
ecological exposures are currently under control and no unacceptable exposures are
occurring." Protectiveness Determinations Guidance at 4.

9
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Protectiveness Determinations Guidance and revise its protectiveness statement for all
sites and Parcels at HPNS to properly characterize the protectiveness of the remedy.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The Navy's own calculations demonstrate that the Navy's Remediation Goals
are not protective of human health. Because the calculated risk associated with the
Navy's soil Remediation Goals is outside ofEPA's risk range under CERCLA, the
Navy should adopt EPA' s more protective residential Preliminary Remediation Goals
for soil, and should amend RODs for Parcels at HPNS to adopt remedies that can meet
the more protective Remediation Goals. The Navy should stop relying on soil covers
and land use restrictions in its remediation of soil contaminated with radiological
waste at HPNS. Rather than leaving this hazardous waste in place in HPNS soils to
expose future residents and visitors to the hazards of radiation, the Navy should
conduct a thorough radiological survey at HPNS , and remove and properly dispose of
hazardous and radioactive waste located at HPNS. Finally, the Navy should revise the
Protectiveness Determinations in the Fourth FYR to properly characterize the remedy
at each Parcel.
Thank you for your consideration of these comments. If you have any
questions, you can reach me at (415) 442-6675 or by email at rmullaney@ggu.edu.

Sincerely,

Robert D. Mullaney
Environmental Law and Justice Clinic
Golden Gate University School of Law
Attorneys for Greenaction for Health and
Environmental Justice

ATTACHMENT 1
NAVF AC' s "Facts About Durable Covers and Protecting Health at Hunters Point"
Hunters Point Naval Shipyard I August 2019

Facts About Durable Covers and Protecting
Health at Hunters Point
H unter s Poi nt Naval Sh ipyard I A ugust 20·19

Public health and safety is the Navy's first priority in the
cleanup at Hunters Point Naval Shipyard (HPNS). The Navy
works closely with federal, state and city agencies to ensure
the safe transfer of HPNS to the City of San Francisco.
The Navy develops a specific work plan for every parcel
at HPNS, and each undergoes regulatory review.
The Navy has successfully remediated and transferred bases
across the country and leverages its expertise to implement
protective solutions for each individual facility, including
Hunters Point.
One solution used to protect public health and the environment
is called a "durable cover." Environmental and civil engineers
determine the correct type of cover- usually pavement or
soil- and the cover thickness required to ensure public safety.
Soil cover designs also take into account local seismic stability
factors to ensure integrity during earthquake events.
The use of durable covers was determined to be protective
for certain Hunters Point parcels and approved as part of the
regulatory process defined by the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). Public
meetings were held to present proposed remedial plans, and
the selected remedies were then documented in the Records
of Decision for each Parcel.

. : FAQ -:

.

Is the Navy's use of covers new
at Hunters Point?
Durable covers have been used for
many years at HPNS. These covers
were approved as part of the standard
regulatory process that includes
community input before decisions
were finalized.

.

.

Durable cover solutions are in place at Parcels B, C, D-1, D-2,
E, G, UC-1, UC-2 and UC-3 as permanent protective measures
to ensure public safety by preventing exposure to naturally
occurring asbestos, metals and any remain ing contamination
in soil. The r:leanup actions for radiolooical contaminants do not
rely on the durable cover; instead the deanuo aoals for these
contaminants assume the durable cover is not present.
To ensure that the covers are not disturbed and remain protective,
the Navy monitors and maintains them through regular
inspections of soil and pavement conditions, cracks in building
foundations, settlement, accumu lation of surface water, signs
of erosion, the condition of survey benchmarks and signs of
vandalism. The durable covers are also assessed as part of the
Five-Year Review process under CERCLA to ensure that they will
continue to be protective of human health and the environment .
After property is transferred to civilian control, the city can
develop the property in accordance with regulatory procedures
and controls that take the durable covers into account.
Additionally, the requirement to inspect and maintain the durable
covers continues after property conveyance and development.

..

.

Once homes are built, could
residents' gardens and plants
bring contamination from
underground to the surface?
No. When HPNS parcels are
transferred and developed,
gardening and other intrusive
activities into the durable cover will
be prohibited in a binding land use
control legal covenant.

. . ·.

·--·:·

What happens if a cover is damaged
due to animal or seismic activity?
Covers are inspected regularly by the
Navy. Whenever problems are found, they
are corrected. After property transfer,
the inspection and maintenance
requirement will continue with the
city, developer or other associations
depending on the location.

More information about the Navy's cleanup work at Hunters Point is available at bracpmo.navy.mi l/hpnsrc.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

3

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

4

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

5
6

UNITED STATES OF. AMERICA,
Plaintiff,

7
8

v.

9

JUSTIN E. HUBBARD,

10

Defendant.

Case No. CR 17-278 JD
DECLARATION OF DAVID J. KAPPELMAN
1N SUPPORT OF GOVERNMENT'S
SUPPLEMENTAL SENTENCING
MEMORANDUM RE: LACK OF
SENTENCING DISPARITY AND RISK OF

HARM

11

Date: March 21, 2018
Time:· 10:30am

12

13
14
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16
17

1.

I make this declaration in support of the Government's Memorandum Regarding

Sentencing Disparity.

2.

I am a health physicist with the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA").

18

I have been so employed since March 1995. I have a Bachelor of Science de~ree in Electrical and

1~

Electronic Engineering from the California State University of Sacramento. I have worked as a Nuclear

20

Engineer or Health Physicist since March 1992. I have training and experience in radiological detection

21

and quantification. I have performed Gamma Spectroscopy on environmental matrices (soil, water, air,

22

etc.) and on performance evaluation samples while employed by the EPA National Air and Radiation

23

Environmental Laboratory and was the Deputy Team Commander of the Radiological Emergency

24

Response Team responding to radiation emergencies nationwide. I currently work for the EPA

25

Environmental Response ·Team assisting EPA regions with Superfund radiological emergency response,

26

site investigations, cleanups, and oversight nationwide. I have been assisting EPA Region 9 with

27 reviewing prior documentation and new U.S. Navy work plans to verify that the Navy's radiological
28

1

cleanup meets the release criteria specified in the EPA Record of Decision for Hunters Point Naval

2

Shipyard.

3

3.

Hunters Point Naval Shipyard, (HPNS), is a Superfund site located in southeastern San

4

Francisco, California, and was first listed on the National Priorities List (NPL) in 1989. The NPL is a

5

list of Superfund Sites that are given national priority for cleanup, based upon an assessment of the level

6

of threat posed to human health or the environment from known or threatened releases of hazardous

7

substances or pollutants at the site. The HPNS is currently owned by the U.S. Navy, which is the lead

8

agency responsible for the cleanup. In addition to serving as a repair facility for the U.S. Navy, the·

9

HPNS Superfund Site was the location for the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory (NRDL),

10

operated by the Navy, from 1948 to 1969. The work at NRDL included radiological decontamination of

11

ships exposed to atomic weapons testing as well as research and experiments on radiological

12

decontamination and the effect of radiation on living organisms and materials.

13

4.

The Superfund investigation and cleanup of contamination at HPNS is a multi-phase

14

project that has b~en on-going for more than 20 years. After a comprehensive historical assessment, the

.15

Navy identified 84 areas that either were contaminated or had the potential to be contaminated by

16

radiological materials. The radionuclide contaminants at the Site that pose a threat to human health and

17

the environment include, among others, radium-226, plutonium-239, strontium-90, and cesium-137.

18

The Navy addressed each area through a time critical removal action to immediately identify and

19

remove the radioactive contamination in soil, debris, and buildings base-wide. Tetra Tech, EC Inc.

20

(TtEC) was the contractor hired by the Navy to perform this portion of the cleanup. TtEC provided

21

radiological investigation and remediation services to the Navy at Hunters Point Naval Shipyard from

22

2003 to 2014.

23

5.

The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease ~egistry (ATSDR) provides the following

24

information on radium-226, plutonium-239, strontium-90, and cesium 137, the radionuclides of concern:

25

a. Radium-226 is one of the two main isotopes of radium found in the environment. Radium is a

26

radioactive substance formed from the breakdown of uranium and thorium. Radium has been shown to

27

cause effects on the blood (anemia) and eyes (cataracts). It also has been shown to affect the teeth,

28

1 causing an increase in broken teeth and cavities. Exposure to high levels of radium results in an
2

increased incidence ofbone, liver, and breast cancer. The EPA and the National Academy of Sciences,

3

Committee on Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation, have stated that radium is a known human

4

carcinogen.

5

b. Plutonium is a radioactive material that is produced in nuclear reactors; only trace ~aunts

6

occur naturally. The most common plutonium isotope is plutonium-239. The main health effect from

7

exposure to plutonium is cancer which may occur years after exposure. The types of cancers most likely

8 to develop are cancers of the lung, bones, and liver. The Department of~ealth and Human Services
9

(DllliS), International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), and the EPA's Office of Air and

10 Radiation (OAR) consider plutonium to be a human carcinogen.
11

c. Strontium-90, a radioactive isotope of strontium, is formed in nuclear reactors or during the

12 explosion of nuclear weapons. Radioactive strontium generates beta particles as it decays. Exposure to
13

stable or radioactive strontium occurs from ingesting contaminated food or drinking water or breathing

14 contaminated air. High levels of radioactive strontium can cause anemia or cancer. The International
15 Agency for Research on Cancer (JARC) has determined that radioactive strontium is a human
16 carcinogen.
17
18

d. Two radioactive forms of cesium~ including cesium-13 7 are produced by nuclear explosions
or the breakdown of uranium in fuel elements. Cesium binds strongly to moist soils and does not travel

19 far below the surface of the soil. One can be exposed to radioactive cesium by eating food that was
20

grown in contaminated soil, or by coming near a source of radioactive cesium. Exposure to large

21

amounts of radioactive cesium damages cells from the radiation. Acute radiation syndrome can occur,

22, which includes nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, bleeding, coma, and even death incases ofvery high
23
24

exposures.

6.

During the relevant period, Justin Hubbard and Stephen Rolfe were two Tetra Tech

25

Radiological Task Supervisors who oversaw all the field sampling necessary to determine the scope and

26

extent of radiological contamination under the Navy's and Tetra Tech's work plans. Justin Hubbard was

27 responsible for overseeing sampling at numerous locations, including the North Pier. Historically, Berth
28

1 6, 7, 8, and 9 at the North Pier were used for berthing ships associated with radiological actiyities,
2 including Operation Crossroads, NRDL experimental and waste disposal barges. Operation Crossroad
3 ships were contaminated by radioactivity during atomic bomb testing at the Bikini Atoll in 1946.
4

Hundreds of ships became contaminated, the most heavily impacted of which were sent to HPNS for

5 decontamination.

6

7.

·Justin Hubbard admitted to falsifying samples taken at the North Pier on May 31, 2012,

7

from four separate survey units. The total number of samples falsifi~d from these four survey units was

8

approximately 80. These were samples taken for the final survey, meaning, if the sample dirt passed the

9

standard for release, the area was deemed "clean" freeing it up for eventual release by the Navy to

10 · civilian authorities. It was only the action of the Navy catching the falsification that caused the areas to
11

be re~sampled. Re-sampling determined that excessive levels of radiation remained after fraudulently

12 being deemed clean by Tetra Tech employees, including Justin Hubbard. One of the survey units
13

deemed clean by Justin Hubbard, Survey Unit 1, required multiple additional survey sampling and two

14 additional dirt removals before it finally met the release criteria for radium-226, that is 1 pico curie per

15 gram orless.
16

8.

Because of the possible adverse health effects from ionizing radiation and the long decay

17 periods (half-lives) for many radionuclides, removal and off-site disposal is considered the most
18

effective option for most of the radioactive contaminants found at HPNS. For example, the half-life of

19 radium-226, the radionuclide left behind by Mr. Hubbard on the North Pier is 1,600 years. Physical
20

removal of radioactive materials ensures that the potential for diffuse radioactivity is reduced to levels

21

that meet or are below clean up goals.
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